<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Insights on securecode.dev</title><link>https://securecode.dev/blog/</link><description>Recent content in Insights on securecode.dev</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://securecode.dev/blog/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>AI Security Risks in SaaS Platforms</title><link>https://securecode.dev/insights/ai-security-risks-in-saas-platforms/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://securecode.dev/insights/ai-security-risks-in-saas-platforms/</guid><description>&lt;p>AI-enabled SaaS features often get reviewed as isolated prompts or model calls, but the meaningful risk usually sits in the surrounding application workflow. Permissions, tenant boundaries, tool execution, retrieval pipelines, and output handling all matter more than the model alone.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Threat Modeling Modern APIs</title><link>https://securecode.dev/insights/threat-modeling-modern-apis/</link><pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://securecode.dev/insights/threat-modeling-modern-apis/</guid><description>&lt;p>Threat modeling APIs is often reduced to a short checklist around authentication and transport security. That rarely surfaces the issues that matter most. Real API risk tends to come from workflow design, trust assumptions between services, and weak authorization at object or action boundaries.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Building Security Into CI/CD</title><link>https://securecode.dev/insights/building-security-into-ci/cd/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://securecode.dev/insights/building-security-into-ci/cd/</guid><description>&lt;p>Security controls in CI/CD often fail for one of two reasons: they trigger too late to be useful, or they create enough noise that teams stop trusting them. Good pipeline security design is less about adding more scanners and more about deciding where feedback belongs.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Secure AI Integration Patterns</title><link>https://securecode.dev/insights/secure-ai-integration-patterns/</link><pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://securecode.dev/insights/secure-ai-integration-patterns/</guid><description>&lt;p>The safest AI integrations do not rely on the model to be correct, aligned, or cautious. They assume the model can be manipulated, can hallucinate, and can generate plausible but unsafe output. The surrounding system is what turns those limitations into manageable engineering risk.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Practical Product Security Reviews</title><link>https://securecode.dev/insights/practical-product-security-reviews/</link><pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://securecode.dev/insights/practical-product-security-reviews/</guid><description>&lt;p>Product security reviews are easy to make expensive and hard to make useful. A review that produces a long list of generic best practices may look thorough while still failing to help the team make better decisions.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>